

# **Network Security**

## Public Key Cryptography

# Public Key Cryptography

## *Agenda:*


- **Message authentication** – authentication codes and hash functions
- **Public key encryption** – principles and algorithms
- **Exchange** of conventional keys
- **Digital signatures**
- Revisit **key management**

# Recall Security Services

- **Confidentiality** – protection from passive attacks
- **Authentication** – you are who you say you are
- **Integrity** – received as sent, no modifications, insertions, shuffling or replays

# Security Attacks

## Passive threats



- eavesdropping, monitoring transmissions
- conventional encryption helped here


# Security Attacks

NEW YORKER



**On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog**  
- by Peter Steiner, New York, July 5, 1993

# Security Attacks




- Message authentication helps prevents these!

# What Is Message Authentication

- It's the "source," of course!
- Procedure that allows communicating parties to verify that received messages are authentic
- Characteristics:
  - source is authentic – *masquerading*
  - contents unaltered – *message modification*
  - timely sequencing – *replay*

# Can We Use Conventional Encryption?

- Only sender and receiver share a key
- Include a time stamp
- Include error detection code and sequence number






# Message Authentication Sans Encryption

- Append an authentication tag to a message
- Message read independent of authentication function
- No message confidentiality

# Message Authentication w/o Confidentiality

- *Application that broadcasts a message* – only one destination needs to monitor for authentication
- *Too heavy a load to decrypt* – random authentication checking
- *Computer executables and files* – checked when assurance required


# Life Without Authentication



# Message Authentication Code

- Message Authentication Code (MAC) – use a secret key to generate a small block of data that is *appended* to the message
- *Assume*: A and B share a common secret key  $K_{AB}$
- $MAC_M = F(K_{AB}, M)$

# Message Authentication Code



# Message Authentication Code

- Receiver assured that message is **not altered** – no modification
- Receiver assured that the message is **from the alleged sender** – no masquerading
- Include a sequence number, assured **proper sequence** – no replay

# Message Authentication Code


- DES is used
- Need **not** be reversible
- Checksum
- Stands up to attack
- But there is an alternative...

# One Way Hash Function

- Hash function accepts a *variable* size message  $M$  as input and produces a *fixed-size* message digest  $H(M)$  as output
- No secret key as input
- Message digest is sent with the message for authentication
- Produces a fingerprint of the message



# One Way Hash Function




Message digest  $H(M)$

Shared key

Authenticity is assured

# One Way Hash Function



Digital signature

No key distribution


Less computation since message does not have to be encrypted

# One Way Hash Function

*Ideally We Would Like To Avoid Encryption*

- Encryption **software** is **slow**
- Encryption **hardware costs** aren't cheap
- Hardware optimized toward **large data** sizes
- Algorithms covered by **patents**
- Algorithms subject to **export control**

# One Way Hash Function



$$MD_M = H(S_{AB} || M)$$

No encryption for message authentication  
Secret value never sent; can't modify the message  
Important technique for **Digital Signatures**

# Hash Function Requirements

1.  $H$  can be applied to a block of data of any size
2.  $H$  produces a fixed length output
3.  $H(x)$  is relatively easy to compute
4. For any given code  $h$ , it is computationally infeasible to find  $x$  such that  $H(x) = h$  ← one way
5. For any given block  $x$ , it is computationally infeasible to find  $y \neq x$  with  $H(y) = H(x)$  ← weak collision resistance
6. It is computationally infeasible to find any pair  $(x,y)$  such that  $H(x) = H(y)$  ← strong

weak

# Simple Hash Functions

- **Input:** sequence of  $n$ -bit block
- **Processed:** one block at a time producing an  $n$ -bit hash function
- **Simplest:** Bit-by-bit XOR of every block  $C_i = b_{i1} \oplus b_{i2} \oplus \dots \oplus b_{im}$
- Longitudinal **redundancy check**

# Bitwise XOR

	bit 1	bit 2	• • •	bit $n$
block 1	$b_{11}$	$b_{21}$		$b_{n1}$
block 2	$b_{12}$	$b_{22}$		$b_{n2}$
	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
block $m$	$b_{1m}$	$b_{2m}$		$b_{nm}$
hash code	$C_1$	$C_2$		$C_n$


- Problem: Eliminate predictability of data
- **One-bit circular shift** for each block is used to randomize the input

# SHA-1 Secure Hash Function

- Developed by NIST in 1995
- Input is processed in 512-bit blocks
- Produces as output a 160-bit message digest
- *Every bit of the hash code is a function of every bit of the input*
- Very secure – so far!




# SHA-1 Secure Hash Function



*Every bit of the hash code is a function of every bit of the input!*

# SHA-1 Secure Hash Function



# Other Hash Functions

- Most follow basic structure of SHA-1
- This is also called an **iterated hash function** – Ralph Merkle 1979
- *If the compression function is collision resistant, then so is the resultant iterated hash function*
- Newer designs simply refine this structure

# MD5 Message Digest

- Ron Rivest - 1992
- RFC 1321
- Input: arbitrary Output: 128-bit digest
- Most widely used secure hash algorithm – until recently
- Security of 128-bit hash code has become questionable (1996, 2004)


# RIPEMD-160

- European RIPE Project – 1997
- Same group launched an attack on MD5
- Extended from 128 to 160-bit message digest

# HMAC

- Effort to develop a **MAC** derived from a cryptographic **hash code**
- Executes **faster** in software
- No export restrictions
- Relies on a **secret key**
- **RFC 2104** list design objectives
- Used in **Ipsec**
- Simultaneously verify **integrity** and **authenticity**

# HMAC Structure



By passing  $S_i$  and  $S_o$  through the hash algorithm, we have pseudorandomly generated two keys from  $K$ .

# Public Key Encryption

- Diffie and Hellman – 1976
- First **revolutionary** advance in cryptography in thousands of years
- Based on **mathematical functions** not bit manipulation
- **Asymmetric**, two separate key
- **Profound effect** on confidentiality, key distribution and authentication



# Public Key Encryption



Whitfield Diffie



Martin Hellman


*Famous Paper:*

**New Directions In Cryptography - 1976**

# Public Key Structure


- **Plaintext:** message input into the algorithm
- **Encryption algorithm:** transformations on plaintext
- **Public & Private Key:** pair of keys, one for encryption; one for decryption
- **Ciphertext:** scrambled message
- **Decryption algorithm:** produces original plaintext

# Folklore



- 1969 Alternative Culture Film
- The names have stuck
- This is meaningless trivia!!!


# Public Key Encryption



# The Basic Steps

- Each user *generates* a *pair* of keys
- The *public key* goes in a public register
- The *private key* is kept private
- If Bob wishes to send a private message to Alice, Bob *encrypts* the message using Alice's *public* key
- When Alice receives the message, she *decrypts* using her *private* key

# Public Key Authentication



# Public Key Applications

- **Encryption/decryption** – encrypts a message with the recipient's public key
- **Digital signature** – sender *signs* a message with private key
- **Key Exchange** – two sides cooperate to exchange a session key

# Requirements For Public Key

- Easy for party  $B$  to generate pairs: public key  $KU_b$  ; private key  $KR_b$
- Easy for sender  $A$  to generate ciphertext using public key:

$$C = E_{KU_b}(M)$$

- Easy for receiver  $B$  to decrypt using the private key to recover original message

$$M = D_{KR_b}(C) = D_{KR_b}[E_{KU_b}(M)]$$

HINT:

PUBLIC

PRIVATE



# Requirements For Public Key

- It is computationally **infeasible** for an opponent, knowing the public key  $KU_b$  to **determine the private key**  $KR_b$
- It is computationally **infeasible** for an opponent, knowing the public key  $KU_b$  and a ciphertext,  $C$ , to **recover** the original message,  $M$
- **Either** of the two related keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for **decryption**

$$M = D_{KR_b}[E_{KU_b}(M)] = D_{KU_b}[E_{KR_b}(M)]$$

# RSA Algorithm

- Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, Len Adleman – 1978
- Most widely accepted and implemented approach to public key encryption
- Block cipher where  $M$  and  $C$  are integers between  $0$  and  $n-1$  for some  $n$
- Following form:

$$C = M^e \bmod n$$

$$M = C^d \bmod n = (M^e)^d \bmod n = M^{ed} \bmod n$$

# RSA Algorithm

- Sender and receiver know the values of  $n$  and  $e$ , but **only the receiver knows the value of  $d$**
- Public key:  $KU = \{e, n\}$
- Private key:  $KR = \{d, n\}$

# RSA Requirements

- It is possible to find values of  $e$ ,  $d$ ,  $n$  such that  $M^{ed} = M \pmod n$  for all  $M < n$
- It is relatively easy to calculate  $M^e$  and  $C$  for all values of  $M < n$
- It is **infeasible** to determine  $d$  given  $e$  and  $n$

Here is the magic!



# RSA Algorithm

## Key Generation

Select $p, q$	$p$ and $q$ both prime
Calculate $n = p \times q$	
Calculate $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$	
Select integer $e$	$\text{gcd}(\phi(n), e) = 1; 1 < e < \phi(n)$
Calculate $d$	$d = e^{-1} \text{ mod } \phi(n)$
Public key	$KU = \{e, n\}$
Private key	$KR = \{d, n\}$

# RSA Algorithm

## Encryption

Plaintext:  $M < n$

Ciphertext:  $C = M^e \pmod{n}$

## Decryption


Ciphertext:  $C$

Plaintext:  $M = C^d \pmod{n}$

# RSA Example

- Select **two prime numbers**,  $p=7$  and  $q=17$
- Calculate  $n = pq = 7 \times 17 = 119$  ← this is the modulus
- Calculate  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 96$  ← Euler totient
- Select  $e$  such that  $e$  is relatively prime to  $\phi(n) = 96$  and less than  $\phi(n)$  ; in this case,  $e=5$
- Determine  $d$  such that  $de = 1 \pmod{96}$  and  $d < 96$ . The correct value is  $d = 77$ ,  
because  
 $77 \times 5 = 385 = 4 \times 96 + 1$  ↑  
multiplicative inverse of  $e$

# RSA Example






# RSA Strength

- **Brute force attack**: try all possible keys – the larger  $e$  and  $d$  the more secure
- The larger the key, the slower the system
- For large  $n$  with large prime factors, factoring is a hard problem
- **Cracked** in 1994 a 428 bit key; **\$100**
- Currently 1024 key size is considered strong enough

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



Enables two users to exchange a secret key securely.

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange


Generation of Secret Key by User A

$$K = (Y_B)^{X_A} \bmod q$$

Generation of Secret Key by User B

$$K = (Y_A)^{X_B} \bmod q$$

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



# Other Public Key Algorithms

- Digital Signature Standard (DSS) – makes use of SHA-1 and presents a new digital signature algorithm (DSA)
- Only used for digital signatures not encryption or key exchange


# Other Public Key Algorithms

- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) – it is beginning to challenge RSA
- Equal security for a far smaller bit size
- Confidence level is not as high yet

# Digital Signatures

- Use the **private key** to encrypt a message
- Entire encrypted message serves as a **digital signature**
- Encrypt a small block that is a function of the document, called an **authenticator** (e.g., SHA-1)

# Public Key Authentication






# Digital Certificate

- **Certificate** consists of a *public key* plus a *user ID* of the key owner, with the whole block signed by a trusted third party, the **certificate authority (CA)**
- **X.509** standard
- SSL, SET and S/MIME
- **Verisign** is primary vendor

# Public Key Certificate Use



# Important URLs

- <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsg-tutorial>  
Discusses the legal implications of **digital signature** usage. (American Bar Association)
- <http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/>  
Take a look at **Volume 2, No. 1 - Spring 1996** for the “Asymmetric Encryption: Evolution and Enhancements”

# Homework

- Read Chapter Three
- Scan Appendix 3A

# Assignment 1

- Pick [sun.com](http://sun.com) and one other site. Using [whois](#) and [ARIN](#), get as much information as possible about the IP addressing, the DNS and the site (location, owner, etc.)
- Problems (p83): 3.5,c and 3.6
- Due next class March 6